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 The article presents a critical view of the two concepts of the resolution 
of the conflicts on the territory of southeastern Europe and particularly on the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia. They are the American initiative SECI and 
the European Union’s regional initiative.  
 The author finds the American initiative of the cooperation between the 
states on that territory unrealistic. It means linking the unlinkable (similar to 
the former COMECON) and serves American Eastern interests and plans. The 
EU regional initiative is more logical since there is nothing hidden behind it, 
unlike the SECI. 
 The author thinks that both proposals are unacceptable for Croatia. Croa-
tian interests lie with Western Europe - economic as well as others, 
particularly political, so EU would do better to forge ties with Croatia. 
 
 For some time now Croatia has been netted by proposals regarding the 
need for its integration with its eastern neighbors. It started by giving 
strong support to dubios individual proposals, which was followed by 
elaborating such ideas at international meetings which were organized 
solely for that purpose, to be eventually outlined in the American Pro-
posal for Cooperation in Southeastern Europe and the European Union's 
Regional Balkan approach. 
 Formally independent, both proposals have come from the same source, 
which suggests that this is a coordinated bipartite approach. This accounts 
for differences in proposals. European Union's Regional Approch is indi-
vidually binding, while the US Proposal is reportedly not, although any 
analysis will show that this is not the case. 
 Common basis for the aforementioned approaches can be found in the 
New Transatlantic Program (NTA) which was signed in December 1995 by 
the Unites States and the European Union. This program is characterized 
by “turning solemn promises into common programs” on a number of 
issues. 
 More precisely, the program for the “soulution of all historical, political 
and ethnic problems of the Balkan region” (J.C. Kornblum, Nova atlantska 
 
Mileta, V., Why are southeastern regional..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 3—16 4 
                                                                                                                                              
zajednica, Tjedni pregled, No. 25, 1996) is shared by the US and the 
European Union, and the fact that it is formally expressed in two ap-
proaches results from the fact that they do not have the same set of 
tools needed for intervention. 
 European Union, still primarily an economic community, has economic 
instruments at its disposal. The United States does not have immediate 
economic instruments, but its set of tools includes political and security in-
struments (authority of a super power and the NATO system with the 
Partneship for Peace), which cannot be ignored. 
 The combination of political, economic and security instruments can be 
so efficient, that the country which does not accept proposals put forward 
by such super powers must have good reasons for rejecting them. 
 This is why the question whether Croatia has good reasons for reject-
ing such approaches is a pertinent one. The answer is simple - yes, it has 
reasons related to both the form and the content. Formally, Croatia as a 
sovereign and internationally recognized state has the right to reject vari-
ous proposals, particularly those that represent an immediate of indirect 
threat or can jeopardize its international status. Contentwize, any country 
including Croatia will accept those forms of international cooperation which 
it assesses as beneficial, and reject those forms of international cooperation 
which are assessed as disadvantageous. 
 The size of a country is not an essential issue in international coopera-
tion. Acceptance or rejection of international cooperation is a common 
situation in the international community, particularly regarding economic 
relations. This is true of both big and small states. 
 For example, during Reagan's administration, the USA put forward a 
proposal to introduce a liberal exchange system for agricultural products 
on a global level. The proposal was accompanied by a solemn promise 
that the USA would participate if other countries participate, and that it 
would do it no later than 1999. 
 Although the message was a global one, it was, in the first place ad-
dressed to the European Union (for years there has been a smouldering 
agricultural war between the US and the European Union), which ignored 
it and has never even considered it. 
 Clearly, the European Union found that accepting such a proposal 
would be to its disadvantage. This case might not be a typical one, since 
it concerns two economic giants, which cannot impose their will on each 
other. However, such behavior can be found even in relations between gi-
ants and dwarfs. For example, Norway has twice refused to become a 
European Union member. On both occasions Norwegian people decided 
that the goverment representatives had been hasty in putting their initials 
on the agreement on European Union membership, and by saying “no” at 
the referendum they warned the government not to do it again. 
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 Something similar might happen to some other less developend mem-
bers of the European Union, due to the growing dissatisfaction of the 
people (particularly farmers). This is suggested by numerous public opinion 
polls as well as the fact that the Union had to earmark funds for the 
promotion of union values. 
 Consequently, there are no a priori standpoints, according to which a 
country would have to accept something just because some other country 
has taken the liberty of offering it claiming that it would beneficial for 
that country, although the country in question does not see it that way. 
 Let us set aside the fact that former communist countries, now being 
countries in transition are fed up with various proposals and all kinds of 
missions whose aim is to teach them about the benefits of various amal-
gams. An essential question remains - what are the threads that bind vari-
ous countries and nations, and is it really best for them to be put in a 
retort where money and property are sacrosanct measures of value. 
 According to Kornblum, this seems to be the best policy. He says that 
his country's strength rests on the ability to create ideas and actions in 
“unpredictable ways”. Moreover, he asserts that the strength of the USA 
comes from the fact that it “has absorbed people from all countries”, 
which has provided it with large-scale “creative thinking”, and being the 
world's largest laboratory for social change it inspires people who can 
identify with it. This is why, says Kornblum, in a “certain sense” the USA 
is a closely knit fabric at a time of disuniting developments in many 
European communities. 
 Some might disagree here. In his good Marxist manner Kornblum obvi-
ously believes that the quantity eventually turns into quality. If this was 
really the case, then the United States would not be what it actually is. 
The reasons are quite different. 
 Intensification of the American approach in Europe at the turn of the 
century is more deeply rooted and its intentions are of a different kind. 
Today it is obvious that American post-war leading position has been seri-
ously shaken. New powerful systems, such as the European Union, have 
upset the established schemes and in many areas require articulation which 
they are entitled to by their nature. 
 Nothing can happen in today's Europe without the involvement of the 
European Union, neither can in the Pacific without Japan's. Monoangular 
world has now become triangular, and the new roles have been assigned 
accordingly. This is now the case in the area of economy, and the same 
will hapen in politics soon. 
 When Americans seek new forms of integration, it is then an attempt 
to maintain their leading position in a new way. A case in point is the 
proposal to create the New Transatlantic Community, which would, ac-
cording to the proposal, besides the security aspect (NATO) include eco-
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nomic and political issues. Therefore, in the area of economy, a free trade 
zone has been proposed (free transatlantic market), and in the area of 
politics joint responsibility of the European Union for political processes in 
Europe and an agreed course of action in crisis areas both in Europe and 
worldwide. In the Pacific area this would be implemented through a pro-
spective Pacific free trade zone, whereas Latin America has already been 
covered by the NAFTA system. 
 Changes in the American approach to global issues could first be seen 
in the middle of Clinton's first presidential mandate. At that time (1993), 
at a conference in Seattle American ideas of mutual cooperation were 
presented to presidents and prime ministers of 18 Pacific states. The same 
was repeated with European states in late 1995, when the NTA program 
was signed, whereas the NAFTA system (Northamerican free trade zone) 
is slowly reaching Latin America via Mexico. 
 In each of these projections, the key “local” partner is sought. In 
Europe it is the European Union, and in view of the NTA program, it 
may be said that the two partners basically share their attitude to the 
southeastern part of Europe, although there are some significant differ-
ences. 
 The most obvious difference is that regarding scope. Ameican proposal 
includes a larger number of countries, while the European Union's pro-
gram is restricted only to the new states created on the territory of for-
mer Yugoslavia. Furhtermore, the American program also includes some 
countries which have already established contractual relations with the 
European Union (Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria - as associate 
members, and Turkey - as tariff union member). There are also differ-
ences in content. Unlike the European Union's program, which is binding, 
the SECI program is supposedly not binding and it is based on the prin-
ciple on interest. On the other hand, acceptance of rejection of the Un-
ion's program can affect the economic relations of each country stated in 
the regional program with the European Union. 
 Regional approaches and programs are not a novelty in the activities of 
the European Union which focus on particular regions. It has developed 
similar programs for more or less all world's regions: Central European 
program, Mediterranean program, Latin American program, a special pro-
gram for Russia and the ASEAN countries. 
 In fact, for its numerous relations with various countries, the European 
Union has developed a network of contracts and strategies. And, as far as 
I know, none of them includes guidelines which can now be found in its 
latest Regional Approach. So far, meeting some standard requirements in 
the area of human rights, free media, free market and stability of the na-
tional economy has been expected and the adjustment of economic and 
political instruments to the demands of the modern Western market has 
been instisted upon. There have been no conditioned solutions, according 
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to which the European Union would establish contractual relations with a 
country only on condition that the country in question enters a special 
union with one particular country or all its neighboring countries. 
 Indeed, things have been quite the contrary. For example, upon the 
implementation of the Schengen Agreement, Austria should have denied 
all benefits to its neighbors, since under the Agreement, the Austrian bor-
der actually became the border of the European Union, thus ceasing to 
be solely Austrian border. Also, the European Union did not insist on the 
reconciliation between Turkey and Greece, particularly regarding their con-
flict over Cyprus, before it signed the tariff union contract with Turkey. It 
is true that the implementation of the tariff union between Turkey and 
the European Union was postponed for some time, not because of Greece 
(which is a member of the European Union), but due to the issue of 
Kurds and human rights. 
 So, everything is relative and the European Union's actions and its Re-
gional Approach are obviously covers for a hidden agenda, no matter what 
the European Union's leaders and spokesmen are saying now in response 
to Croatian protests. This can be recognized in the interview given by the 
Dutch ambassador to Croatia, where he emphasizes, among many nasty 
things he said about Croatia, that Croatia is an area full of viruses, which 
the Union does not wish to import. In other words, this area first needs 
to be decontaminated, and cooperation might be discussed only when it is 
cleaned.  
 In an extremely undiplomatic manner, he said things which cannot be 
found in the documents, and it is hard to believe that it was just a slip. 
The interview abunds in such “slips”, which leads to the conclusion that 
they, too, serve some purpose and are part of a global strategy. 
 European Union stated its views on the regional approach in a special 
document known as Future Contractual Relations With Some Southeastern 
European Countries. The document was designed by the European Com-
mittee, and was adopted by the European Union's Ministry Council on 
October 28, 1996. 
 Due to the significance of this document, an explanation of it basic 
guidelines might prove useful. First of all, it is a set of principles, which 
are the basis for the development of future relations between the EU and 
the countries stated in the document. However, it should be noted that, 
although mentioned in the introduction, Albania and Macedonia are ex-
empt because these countries have already established certain relations with 
the Union, which is explicitly stated in the document. 
 Practically, the document concerns Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and FR 
Yugoslavia. According to the document, the European Union would estab-
lish contractual relations with these countries and future agreements must 
contain elements of “clear political and economic stipulations, with an em-
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phasis on the respect for human rights, minority rights, rights of refugees 
and displaced persons, democratic institutions, political and economic re-
forms, readiness for open and cooperative relations between these coun-
tries, full implementation of the Peace Treaty provisions” (EU's document 
on the “regional approach”). 
 In other words, the EU has set the following as stipulations for future 
contractual cooperation: 
- respect for human rights in general and minority rights of various na-
tional groups on the territory of the country in question; 
- respect for democratic institutions; 
- respect for political and economic reforms; 
- the countries in question are required to be prepared for open and co-
operative mutual relations and  
- full implementation of the Peace Treaty provisions, which concern the 
preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 There is an additional stipulation for FR Yugoslavia, which is a grant-
ing Kosovo a high level of autonomy. 
 Croatia met these conditions long ago. Human rights in general and 
minority rights of various nationality groups are respected in Croatia. On 
these lines all necessary acts, from the Constitution to a special law on 
minorities providing minority rights of a standard exceeding European 
standards have been passed, which was confirmed by admitting Croatia 
into the European Council. Croatian state also respects the rights of refu-
gees and displaced persons and insists that the other side do the same. 
 Furthermore, Croatia respects democratic institutions. It has legally 
elected government bodies and the Constitutional court which controls the 
government. In Croatia, political parties as well as all kinds of associations 
are entitled to free operation, some of them even being engaged in activi-
ties aimed at destabilizing the government. Political crimes do not exist in 
Croatian legislation, and freedom of speech and writing is not restricted in 
any way. These facts were confirmed by the European Council, when it 
granted Croatia its membership. 
 Political reforms have been implemented in Croatia. Communist legacy 
has been done away with. Political comissioners who dictate what and how 
things should be done have become a matter of the past. According to 
objective assessments made by some foreign institutions, Croatia ranks high 
among transitional countries regading economic reforms and economic re-
vival. 
 Also, Croatia adheres to the Dayton (Paris) Agreement. It recognized 
the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina long ago, when others wanted to sub-
jugate it. The problem lies in the fact that Croatia insists that the Dayton 
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Agreement be consistently implemented, which some other countries are 
not willing to do, and so they use Croatian insistence on granting Croa-
tians in Bosnia-Herzegovina their legitimacy to put the blame on Croatia, 
which is absurd. It is absurd to keep Croatia in some kind of “captivity” 
due to the misconception that all three states are equally to blame for 
the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia. It is even more absurd to 
ignore the fact that the war was imposed on Croatia, that it was fought 
on Croatian territory even before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke 
out, with the Bosnian leadership providing logistic support to the 
aggressor. 
 These are historical facts. They cannot be contested by claims made by 
some politicians that it was a civil war. In this war rockets were launched, 
bombs were dropped, villages were run down by tanks, people were killed 
by various leathal weapons which could not have been in possession of in-
dividual citizens. Some of these demolition devices were produced in some 
Western European countries. 
 These facts are not unknown to the European Union. Its recognition of 
the new Croatian state was based on them. This was done by all Union's 
members. Therefore the question why the Union has now adopted a dif-
ferent stand is appropriate. What does it aim by setting such vague condi-
tions for its future relations with Croatia, so that at any time they could 
be interpreted in such a way to suit the Union? 
 If the European Union really has no other intentions but stabilization 
and good neighborly relations in this troubled area, why has it not stated 
the conditions precisely, as has the European Council? If it had, its inten-
tions would be perfecly clear. 
 What is the actual meaning of the “European Document on Regional 
Approach”, and the suggestion that the contracts signed by “regional ap-
proach” countries with the European union should reflect their individual 
readiness for “open and cooperative relations”? At an individual level, it 
means that the contract Croatia makes with the European Union will con-
tain a provision on its openness and cooperation with Serbia (FR Yugosla-
via) and Bosnia-Herzegovina, not on its own terms but on the terms set 
by the European Union. 
 This is where the problem lies. The problem of the Regional Approach 
lies in the fact that it does not follow the pattern of interstate contractual 
relations and that it imposes approaches which are not common in inter-
state communication. This is why the Croatian government is right when it 
questions such an approach and is not willing to accept a special contract, 
as proposed by the European Union. 
 Croatia is a small country and is therefore very keen on having good 
relations with other countries, particularly with its neighbors. Croatia wants 
to have good relations with Serbia (FR Yugoslavia) too, for many reasons, 
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particularly economic ones. Free use of roads and other infrastucture is in 
Croatia's interest and to its benefit. However, Croatia cannot be interested 
in such “cooperative” relations which are aimed at the kind of integration 
that reeks of times passed. 
 The 45 years spent within Yugoslavia, cost Croatia $US 102 billion. In-
deed, this much was taken away from its GNP for the military, various 
federal institutions and economic assistance to less developed republics of 
the former state. For financing the former federal state, Croatia annually 
set aside over $US 2 billion. 
 It is an enournous amount, and if Croatia had not been robbed of it, 
in terms of economic development Croatia would today belong to the 
group of developed European countries. 
 As can be seen the European Union's Document on Regional Ap-
proach is extremely rigid, it is based on unacceptable and illogical prem-
ises and obviously contains a hidden agenda. How else to account for 
various requirements Croatia is expected to meet, which have no political 
and economic logic. 
 In the so far practice of contractual relations established between the 
European Union and “third countries”, not a single example can be found 
where a country's relations with the Union are conditioned by making 
identical contracts with a country set by the Union. More precisely, in its 
Document, the Union requires all the three countries stated in the docu-
ment to establish cooperative relations in various areas. In their trade re-
lations they are required to grant each other various benefits, and if they 
refuse to do so, then they cannot expect the Union to provide various 
benefits, as stipulated by the contract the Union would sign with each of 
them separately. 
 This is definitely a novelty in contractual relations of the European 
Union with “third countries”. In its practice of international communica-
tion, the Union has developed special types of contracts. They range from 
standard trade contracts to trade contracts including tariff unions and free 
trade zones. As far as we know, none of these contracts contains any 
such binding stipulations. For example, Poland has been granted the asso-
ciate member status. Its contract does not include any provisions suggest-
ing that its relations with the Czech Republic, also an associate member, 
should be of the same kind. The fact that the two countries actually 
practice free trade in their mutual relations has nothing to do with thier 
relations with the Union. It resulted from another agreement, which pro-
vides the basis for the cooperation of Central European countries. So, the 
European Union has developed a special scheme for the countries treated 
in its “Regional Approach”, and created a new type of contractual rela-
tions, which might also be applied elsewhere. 
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 All these “special” efforts of the Union are crowned by its insistence 
on political dialogue. Its guidelines will be set in the form of a Joint 
Statement. The Document does not specify what political dialogue implies. 
It only emphasises its importance for any future agreements with any of 
the stated countries and the fact that negotiations must accompany the ac-
ceptance of the regional aspect of cooperation. 
 The actual implementation of the Document on the “regional approach” 
does not include making one contract for all the three countries in ques-
tion. The Union will make a separate contract on mutual relations with 
each of the countries, which might suggest that it respects the fact that 
these are three separate countries. In fact, no other form is possible at 
the moment. These are now independent states, but this is not about pre-
sent, this is about future implications of the Document. 
 The following paragraph also suggests that the European Union might 
have a hidden agenda: “Future contractual relations (between the Union 
and individual countries - V.M.) are to be established 'case by case', al-
though a certain level of similarity might be taken into account. The first 
agreements with these countries should be restricted to cooperation even if 
in some aspects they could exceed the traditional economic content of the 
first generation of agreements on trade and cooperation”. 
 In other words, Croatia is stopped at the very first step, even if in 
some areas of mutual realations with the Union it has developed elaborate 
forms of cooperation. It is reduced to the contract on trade and coopera-
tion, and all other higher level forms of relations are to remain inaccessi-
ble until some defined and undefined critera set by the Union are 
fulfilled. 
 Croatia cannot accept such an approach. Namely, the members of the 
European Union, that is the Union as a whole, are major trade partners. 
All other economic transactions, too, come to and from the area covered 
by the Union. Economically speaking, Croatia has always been more inte-
grated in this area than in any other part of Europe, even more than 
with countries, former republics of the state she used to be a part of. 
With the exception of Slovenia, Croatia used to do less than 20% of its 
foreign trade with other parts of the former Yugoslavia. And most of it 
was forced on it by economic instruments, since most products could be 
imported from abroad at a lower price and better quality. The fact is that 
Croatia was never really integrated in that “Yugoslav” framework, and this 
is why current efforts to make it integrate with these countries are rather 
dubious. 
 This is illogical even from the Union's point of view. By making Croa-
tia become part of that economic entity it loses a valuable trade partner, 
which might not be crucial to the Union, but is fairly important to some 
of its members, since it is from the Union's countries that Croatia yearly 
imports $US 2 billion worth of various goods. 
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 It seems that the Union included a lot of ambiguities in the Document 
on the “regional approach”, which can be interpreted in different ways. 
Croatian politics has been studying them with utmost care, refusing any 
suggestions leading to a new political union. Croatia is not interested in 
any regional approaches and invokes the document's “evolutive clause” un-
der which the European Union can establish bilateral relations with Croa-
tia regardless of the fact that at the moment “it is impossible to foresee 
when all the required conditions for this will be fulfilled”. 
 Croatian rejection of the Regional Approach and its unwillingness to 
discuss trade and cooperation possibilities with the European Union within 
a package including some other countries made the Union leaders reinter-
pret the Document, saying that its provisions have been misinterpreted, 
that a new political union is out of question and, moreover, that the 
Document appreciates the individuality of each of the three countries and 
that it only contains some criteria binding for all these countries 
(Statement by EU Council of Ministers, Luxembourg, October 28, 1996). 
 However, such statements are not confirmed in practice. Ten days after 
the EU Council of Ministers issued this statement, the EU summoned the 
representatives of the three countries to a conference in Paris, for prelimi-
nary consultations on the beginning of negotiations regarding trade and 
cooperation agreements. However, the treatment of the delegations was 
equal except for the time scheduled for each.  
 In view of this, later statements made by individual Union's functionar-
ies, and individual representatives of member states aimed at taking the 
edge off the Document did not help clarify any points, but only made the 
issue even more confusing, thus showing that the Document's vagueness 
may prove to be a boomerang. 
 The Dutch ambassador to Croatia was one of those who only made 
things even more complicated. In his interview for Novi list (daily pub-
lished in Rijeka) he made many false accusations against Croatia. In an 
utterly undiplomatic manner he revealed the background of the Document, 
asserting that Croatia is still “one of the region's problem areas”, which 
might account for the treatment it is receiving. Furthermore, the Dutch 
ambassador admits the possibility to interpret the Document as a form of 
pressurizing Croatia into saving Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from total 
collapse (Josef W. Scheffers, “We are not willing to import your problems 
into the European Union like viruses”, Novi list, January 24, 1997). 
 The Dutch ambassador is certainly not an odd man out. Estimates 
given by some EU member states follow the same pattern. A case in 
point is Great Britain, whose parliamentary Committee for European Leg-
islature in its “Second Report” insists on a “tougher” treatment of Croatia 
than that of the EU Council of Ministers. 
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 This is why an objective analysis will show that the entire concept of 
future relations with the European Union was based on the idea that the 
Union would “open its door” to individual countries from the region in 
proportion to their oppenness to one another. This is where the condi-
tioning lies, which is believed to be likely to develop into something else. 
 About one month after the European Union issued its regional ap-
proach program, the USA came forward with its Initiative for Cooperation 
in Southeastern Europe. It was presented to the representatives of 11 
states at the conference held in Geneva (December 5-6, 1996), where it 
was the only item on the agenda. At the end of the conference, the Ini-
tiative was signed by nine Countries, with Slovenia and Croatia expressing 
reservations. FR Yugoslavia had also been invited to the conference but 
the invitation was withdrawn due to current political developments in the 
country. However, the invitation will certainly be renewed. 
 The Initiative proposes cooperation of 12 states: Albania, Bosnia-Herze-
govina, Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, Moldavia, Romania, Turkey, Slovenia, 
Croatia and FR Yugoslavia. The list of states included in this Initiative 
clearly suggests the incongruity of the concept. In a joking manner, it 
might be said that the Americans “put together” the countries situated on 
the territory of the former Turkish Empire, disparate world views and in-
compatible interests. 
 Furthermore, the Initiative includes EU full member states or EU asso-
ciate member states, which poses insurmountable obstacles to desired coop-
eration. For example, the European Union has it own concept of various 
infrastructural networks, so it is hard to see how this concept can be 
harmonized with some of the concepts arising from the Initiative. 
 In addition to this, what interest could Slovenia and even Croatia have 
in building roads towards Romania, when their interests are focued in 
quite the opposite direction. 
 And finally, how can this Initiative promote the interest which the 
aforementioned states display for European integrations, when the USA, as 
the chief proponent of this concept, is not member of any European eco-
nomic integration.  
 This is clearly about something else and it has to do with security sys-
tems - the NATO and Partnership for Peace and the development of a 
security corridor around Russia, which, according to some estimates, might 
be a source of threat for Europe. In this context, the discrepancies of the 
Initiative are irrelevant, it is the global objectives that count, and the fact 
that this is not in the interest of some countries covered by the Initiative 
has little relevance. On the other side, however, it is hard to believe that 
Russia will lightly accept the efforts of the NATO system to reach its 
borders. 
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 The initiative was conceived as a forum where representatives of mem-
ber states discuss and decide on common economic and ecological prob-
lems of the region, the solution to which requires coordinated action at 
regional level.  
 Issues of common interest will be elaborated by ad hoc task forces, 
which would meet immediately after the issues have been discussed. They 
would be made up of experts, whose task is to come up with specific 
proposals. 
 The initiative does not rule out other proposals on cooperation in 
Southeastern Europe (EU Regional Concept, the Sofia Declaration on 
Good Neighborly Relations, the Central European initiative and the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation Initiative). It will only attempt to “supplement 
them” in terms of: a) close cooperation of this region's governments; b) 
regional level planning; c) development of new programs and relationships; 
d) assistance in creating such a regional climate that will encourage private 
sector participation. 
 The initiative would have an executive director (“high ranking official”), 
who would be in charge of the realization of decisions made by the me-
meber states, and would facilitate the implementation of projects. This of-
ficial would be elected by the Organization for European Security and Co-
operation, on the demand of Initiative's member states, which is a prece-
dent unknown in the practice of international relations. It is not standard 
practice that an executive director of an organization (even a forum) is a 
person appointed by another organization, which best illustrates the Ameri-
can attitude to these states. The Initiative provides for the establishment 
of a Program Committee, which would adopt programs, set priorities and 
conduct audits. Each member state would appoint one representative to 
the Committee. The UN Economic Committee for Europe would provide 
technical support for the Initiative whose headquarters would be in Vi-
enna, at the Institute for Central Europe and the Danube Region. 
 The term “supporting states” is used throughout the Initiative, It refers 
to all other states which might “in due course” be invited to joint consul-
tations regarding the Initiative. 
 As can be seen, the Initiative's tasks too, are outlined very vaguely. 
They lack substance, and this is what enables the Initiative to start all 
kinds of things. It is also evident that the Initiative's designers wish to re-
serve the “right” to supplement other programs. Accordingly, they could 
also supplement the European Union's Regional Approach, athough the 
Union might not tolerate it. 
 If the Initiative is combined with the EU's Regional Approach and in 
view of the fact that it is not backed up by powerful monetary funds 
(like the European Investment Bank), it remains unclear how some poten-
tial infrastructural projects are to be realized. When designing the Initia-
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tive its initiators must have known that there were no funds for the reali-
zation of programs, and since they have not made their own funds acces-
sible, it is questionable whether the Initiative rests on economic issues or 
is simply a political thing. 
 This fact inevitably calls for caution and leads to questions as to what 
this is all about. To undestand what this is all about, we should go back 
to the New Transatlantic Program and its idea to extend the methods 
which have proven efficient in Western Europe to all Europe. 
 This means that the Initiative is actually the beginning of a broader 
concept which would lead its member states to economic relations, such as 
free trade, through infrastructural projects, and through that to political 
cooperation and various associations which are definitely unacceptable for 
Croatia. 
 We should remember that the European Union developed from the 
European Coal and Steel Union, in other words, simple issues have devel-
oped into ramified systems in the areas of economy, social and political 
life. However, this was an entirely different situation with circumstances 
which do not exist in the area covered by the Initiative. This area com-
prises states which cannot be joined without numerous problems. This is 
why Croatian governement's analysts are right when they are doubtful 
about the Initiative and its plans to isolate Croatia from its natural envi-
ronment. 
 Croatia has no economic and much less political interest in associations 
with areas and countries it has never had close contacts with. For centu-
ries Croatia lived in a different environment, and this is where its major 
interests and plans are now directed. 
 This is why assurances, like those given by the Initiative's appointed 
coordinator (Erhard Busek, Director of the Institute for Central Europe 
and the Danube Region), that the Initiative does not lead to any political 
associations are entirely counterproductive. He claims that the Initiative's 
sole intention is to join the 12 states “in the areas of economy and ecol-
ogy” and to “help develop a road network”. And the fact that he was 
appointed as coordinator (as someone not related to any of the 12 states) 
is only a result of the American belief that relations between Southeastern 
European states are so disrupted that there is hardly anything they can 
agree on. 
 On the other hand, Busek's statement demostrates that the Initiative 
contains a hidden agenda. The very statement that things should be im-
posed on some countries because a neutral party finds it beneficiary for 
them is highly questionable. They should know best what is good and 
what is bad for them. Secondly, economic relations are not a matter of 
good will since economy has its inner logic. In the recent past there were 
some good examples of imposed economic measures through well-elabo-
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rated plans. Former COMECON states elaborated a huge network of co-
operative relations and numerous institutions in order to integrate the area 
covered by COMECON. However, this proved to be futile. The moment 
the discipline loosened, all the European COMECON members turned to 
the West and trade routes changed overnight, which was one of the 
reasons for the break-up of the whole system. And this proves best that 
economic activity cannot be imposed. 
 Because of all this the Initiative is unlikely to succeed. It attempts to 
integrate states which have little in common in such a way that they 
themselves are to pay for integration costs. In other words, they are sup-
posed to apply for credits in order to build something that is not in their 
interest. Things would be quite different had the USA, through its repre-
sentative Richard Schifter, offered non-repayable aid of $US 50 billion, 
which is the amount needed to cover the costs of the first six proposed 
projects (improvements in the power system efficiency, elimination of bot-
tlenecks on transport routes, integration of gas supply systems, promotion 
of small and medium enterprises, revival programs for the Danube region 
and facilitation of border-zone traffic). However, even then the Initiative 
should be rejected if its political requirements led Croatia to permanent 
integration with states which lie outside its interests. 
 Finally, the European Union's Regional Approach and the American 
Initiative are characterized by understatement and vagueness to the extent 
that they might, at any time, take unpredictable directions. Consistent im-
plementation of the Regional Approach might lead to institutionalized 
forms of cooperation with the states of former Yugoslavia, even with the 
state which started the war against Croatia, which is now, of course, unac-
ceptable. On the other hand, the Initiative obviously aims at establishing a 
free trade zone in Southeastern Europe, the purpose of which is not quite 
clear. All Southeastern European states tend towards integration with the 
European Union, some already being its full members, some being associ-
ate members and seeking full membership and some seeking to become 
associate members. In other words, countries of Southeastern Europe have 
not demonstrated any interest in reciprocal economic, and especially not 
political cooperation. Being an American initiative, it is obvious that the 
US want to establish some kind of couterbalance to the European Union 
on the one hand, and by bringing together these states to reach the Rus-
sian border on the other. 
 Assertions like the one that the Initiative is in collusion with the Euro-
pean Union do not contradict the above deduction. At the moment the 
Union is not opposing the Initiative despite the fact that it includes some 
states that are EU full or associate members, because the Initiative eases 
the pressure of potential members. In the ongoing process of reexaminig 
its systems, the European Union might find the Initiative helpful, but the 
question remains for how long. Tomorrow this might no longer be the 
case. 
